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Abstract
The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which describe our universe
are finely-tuned for life, in the sense that if some of the constants had slightly different values
life could not exist. Some people hold that this provides evidence for the existence of God. I will
present a probabilistic version of this fine-tuning argument which is stronger than all other
versions in the literature. Nevertheless, I will show that one can have reasonable opinions such
that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of
God.
1If one prefers, the proposition G can be taken to include the possibility that some
supernatural designer exists, without that designer having all the attributes we would attribute to
God. I mention this possibility because some proponents of intelligent design are at pains to
maintain that they are not arguing for the existence of God, but just for the existence of a
designer. In the case of the fine-tuning argument, that designer would be a designer of the
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1. The Fine-Tuning Argument
This paper is about the fine-tuning argument for the existence of God, which runs roughly as
follows:
Premise 1: The fundamental constants that are involved in the laws of physics which
describe our universe (such as the masses of the fundamental particles and the strength
ratios between the fundamental forces) are finely tuned for life, in the sense that if some
of the constants had values outside some narrow range then life could not exist. (I will
call this “the fine-tuning evidence”.)
Intermediate Conclusion: It would be very unlikely for the universe to have life-
permitting fundamental constants by chance (This follows from Premise 1.)
Premise 2: If God created the universe, we would expect it to be life-permitting.
Premise 3: The universe is life-permitting.
Final Conclusion: Thus, given the fine-tuning evidence, the fact that the universe is life-
permitting provides evidence for the existence of God. (This follows from the
Intermediate Conclusion and Premises 2 and 3.)
This paper has two main theses. I will argue that the specific version of the fine-tuning
argument I will present below is stronger than all other versions in the literature. I will show that
the fine-tuning argument is best presented using a subjectivist interpretation of probability;
objections to the fine-tuning argument which rely on a frequency-based objective or logical
interpretation of probability are flawed. Nevertheless, I am not a proponent of the fine-tuning
argument. My second thesis is that one can have reasonable opinions such that the fine-tuning
argument doesn’t lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God. This doesn’t
count as a full-scale refutation of the fine-tuning argument, since I admit that one can have
reasonable opinions such that the argument does lead to an increase in one’s probability for the
existence of God. But I believe that no stronger reply to the fine-tuning argument is successful. 
The fine-tuning argument is generally not taken, even by its proponents, to provide a
definitive proof of the existence of God. (In contrast, proponents of the ontological and
cosmological arguments generally present their arguments as purely deductive.) As a result, the
fine-tuning argument is well-suited to be represented in a probabilistic framework. So let’s look
at the argument as formulated using probability theory.
The basic version of the probabilistic fine-tuning argument I will be discussing in this
paper is as follows. (The fine-tuning argument is presented in this sort of way by for example
Swinburne (1990, 155), Le Poidevin (1996, 47-8), Collins (1999, 57), Holder (2002, 298-9), and
Manson (2003, 7). There are other versions of the fine-tuning argument in the literature, but I
will be focussing on this one.)
Let L be the proposition that the universe is life-permitting, and let G be the proposition
that God exists.1 According to proponents of the fine-tuning argument, L provides epistemic
universe, so would presumably have to at least be supernatural. 
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support for G. A standard way of understanding the claim that L provides epistemic support for
G is to say that learning that L increases one’s probability for G: P(G|L) > P(G). Proponents of
the fine-tuning argument argue that this inequality holds, since P(L|G) > P(L), and by Bayes’
Theorem:
P(G|L) / P(G) =  P(L|G) / P(L). 
Why is it that case that P(L|G) > P(L)? That claim is equivalent to: 
P(L|G) > P(L|G) P(G) + P(L|~G) P(~G). 
Proponents of the fine-tuning argument maintain that P(L|G) > P(L|~G), and it follows that
P(L|G) > P(L) (because P(L) is a weighted average of P(L|G) and a quantity less than P(L|G)).
Why is it the case that P(L|G) > P(L|~G); why is it more probable that the universe is life-
permitting under the supposition that God exists than under the supposition that God doesn’t?
Here is where proponents of the fine-tuning argument appeal to the evidence of fine-tuning.
They argue that, for various fundamental constants, such as the constant representing the
strength of the gravitational force, and the constant representing the proton/neutron mass
difference, these constants have to have a value in a relatively narrow range in order for life to
exist. (For a nice up-to-date discussion of these fine-tuning claims, see Collins 2003a.)
Proponents of the fine-tuning argument then argue that, if the fundamental constants of the
universe were selected naturalistically (via an objectively chancy process, for example), one
would expect the constants to be such that the universe is not life-permitting. But if the constants
were selected supernaturalistically, one would expect the universe to be life-permitting (because
God would pick the constants so as to guarantee the existence of life). It follows that P(L|G) >
P(L|~G), and thus P(G|L) > P(G), as desired.
2. Objective vs. Subjective Probability
In the previous section, I presented the fine-tuning argument as utilizing a probability function P,
but I did not specify what concept of probability this function was meant to represent. I will now
consider three interpretations of probability, and show that the fine-tuning argument is different
depending on which interpretation of probability one chooses. Specifically, I will show that on
frequency-based objective interpretation, the fine-tuning argument is clearly unsuccessful; on a
logical interpretation, it’s an open question whether the fine-tuning argument is successful; while
on a subjectivist interpretation, the fine-tuning argument looks more promising. 
First, consider a frequency-based objective interpretation of probability, where the
probability for an event is (at least in part) determined by the actual frequency with which the
event has occurred in past trials. For example, on a frequency-based objective interpretation, the
probability of a fair coin landing heads is about 1/2 because out of all coin-flips with these sort
of coins in the past, about half of those coin flips landed heads. 
Now, what happens when the fine-tuning argument is understood as utilizing a
frequency-based objective interpretation of probability? Well, the fine-tuning argument runs into
trouble. This can be seen in one of Elliot Sober’s (2003, 49) criticisms of the fine-tuning
argument. Sober maintains that “the argument from fine-tuning can’t be defended as a claim
about probabilities.” But his criticism relies on a frequency-based objective interpretation of
2Robin Le Poidevin (1996, 49-57) also interprets the fine-tuning argument as utilizing
something like a frequency-based objective interpretation of probability. Le Poidevin considers
only the frequency and propensity theories of probability, and argues that on either theory “it
makes no sense to talk of the probability of a life-sustaining universe in the absence of God”.
(1996, 57). I maintain that Le Poidevin is unfairly saddling the fine-tuning argument with a
frequency or propensity theory of probability; the fine-tuning argument is more promising on a
subjectivist interpretation. 
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probability, and he gives no argument to defend that choice of interpretation.
Sober’s criticism is short and straightforward. He says that “we have neither theory nor
data on which to ground” the claim that P(G|L) > P(G). He concludes that the fine-tuning
argument (when construed as a argument involving probabilities) “makes claims about
probabilities that we have no reason to accept” (2003, 48-9). To justify his claim that we have
neither theory nor data to establish the probabilities, he contrasts the fine-tuning argument with
the firing squad example (Leslie 1989, 13-15), where a prisoner finds himself alive after the
marksmen shoot. Sober maintains that in the firing squad example, when the prisoner finds
himself alive, he should increase his probability for the hypothesis that the marksmen intended to
miss.  The reason this is the case, he says, is that “we have frequency data and our general
knowledge of human behavior on which to ground” the probability shift. The firing-squad
example is meant by Leslie to be analogous to the fine-tuning argument: just as the prisoner’s
being alive is more likely under the design hypothesis than under the chance hypothesis, so the
universe-being life-permitting is ostensibly more likely under the design hypothesis than under
the chance hypothesis. But Sober rejects this analogy, because he maintains that we have no such
frequency data or general knowledge in the case of the fine-tuning argument. 
Sober concludes the section of his paper where he discusses these issues by saying that
not only do we have no reason to accept the fine-tuning argument’s claims about probability,
“we cannot even understand them as objective claims about nature” (2003, 49). I maintain that
the fine-tuning argument is unfairly weakened if it is saddled with the requirement that its
probability claims must be objective claims about nature. Sober is clearly right that we have no
frequency data on the proportion of life-permitting universes, and perhaps he is also right that we
have no theory which can enable us to make objective claims about the probability of a universe
being life-permitting. But these considerations are not sufficient to set aside the probabilistic
fine-tuning argument. There is no requirement in the fine-tuning argument that its claims about
probability be understood as objective claims about nature.
On the subjectivist interpretation of probability, one’s probability for a proposition
represents one’s personal degree of belief that that proposition is true. On the subjectivist
interpretation, the fine-tuning argument would be successful for an agent, as long as that agent’s
subjective probabilities are such that P(G|L) > P(G). (I will discuss in detail how this reasoning
is meant to work in Section 4 below.) Thus, the fine-tuning argument utilizing the subjectivist
interpretation of probability is more promising than the fine-tuning argument utilizing the
frequency-based objective interpretation, because on the subjectivist interpretation there is at
least hope that one can have probability assignments such that the argument is successful.2 
I will now show that the fine-tuning argument fares better on the subjectivist
3A very similar interpretation and critique is given by Colyvan, Garfield, and Priest
(2005). They have pointed out to me (via personal communication) that even an agent reasoning
using subjective probabilities could utilize the Principle of Indifference; I agree, but what I want
to emphasize is that such an agent is not in any way required to.  
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interpretation of probability than it does on a logical interpretation of probability. What I mean
by “a logical interpretation of probability” is that probabilities are determined through a priori
reasoning, such as reasoning in accordance with the Principle of Indifference. Timothy McGrew,
Lydia McGrew, and Eric Vestrup (2001) (henceforth MMV) treat the fine-tuning argument as
utilizing the logical interpretation, and present an emphatic critique of the fine-tuning argument
interpreted in this way.3 They assume that the fine-tuning argument utilizes the Principle of
Indifference, and thus attribute to proponents of the fine-tuning argument the view that it is
unreasonable to assume that one sort of universe is more probable a priori than any other sort.
They then conclude that the fine-tuning argument can’t be coherently formulated, since the space
of possible values of constants for universes is infinite, and hence non-normalizable. They say
that “Probabilities make sense only if the sum of the logically possible disjoint alternatives adds
up to one” (MMV, 203), but that’s not possible for a non-normalizable space of possibilities
where each possibility is treated the same. Either each possibility will be assigned probability
zero, in which case the total will be zero, or each possibility will be assigned some fixed positive
probability, in which case the total will be infinite. They take this reply to succeed in
“demolishing” (MMV, 207) the fine-tuning argument. 
In my opinion, MMV are making too much of a technical issue in probability theory.
Indeed, work has been done on resolving this technical issue. Peter Vallentyne (2000), for
example, has come up with a sophisticated yet natural way of making comparative probability
judgements, even when the various possibilities being compared all have probability zero. I
won’t go into Vallentyne’s solution here; I will just note as a potential problem that what
motivates Vallentyne’s work is simply the intuition that probability judgements should make
sense even when the probabilities for the various disjoint possibilities don’t sum to one (that is,
when countable additivity fails). It follows that it would be open to MMV to reject Vallentyne’s
solution by rejecting that intuition. I conclude that it is an open question whether the fine-tuning
argument on the logical interpretation is promising. 
The fine-tuning argument on the subjectivist interpretation has various benefits over the
fine-tuning argument on the logical interpretation. One benefit is that on the subjectivist
interpretation, one need not rely on the Principle of Indifference. One is open to assign zero
probability to some possible values of constants, and non-zero probability to other possible
values. It follows that the probabilities assigned to the various disjoint possibilities can sum to
one. Another benefit is that on the subjectivist interpretation, one need not even bother to assign
probabilities to the various possible values of constants; one can just assign a probability to the
proposition L that the universe is life-permitting. There is no need to generate one’s probabilities
in any sort of foundational way, by for example assigning probabilities to each element in the
possibility space. As long as the probability assignments one does make are probabilistically
coherent, that is enough to satisfy the constraints of the subjectivist interpretation. The reason it
matters that on the subjectivist interpretation, one need not assign probabilities to the various
6possible values of constants, is that such probability assignments aren’t needed to generate the
fine-tuning argument. This can be seen by looking at the presentation of the argument in the
previous section. 
Once one moves to the subjectivist interpretation, one allows for an agent to have her
personal probability function be such that P(G|L) > P(G), but one also allows for an agent to
have her personal probability function be such that P(G|L) = P(G). For the strongest defense of
the fine-tuning argument, one would have to argue that only probability functions which are such
that P(G|L) > P(G) are reasonable ones; all other probability functions are unreasonable. For a
weaker defense, one could simply argue that for a wide class of agents, it’s actually the case that
their probability functions are such that P(G|L) > P(G). I will now discuss MMV’s criticism of
subjectivist interpretation, which takes issue with these two lines of defense.
MMV are aware that their critique of the fine-tuning argument could be criticized for
relying on a non-subjective account of probability, and so they go on the offensive against the
subjectivist interpretation. They write:
in our opinion it is profoundly unsatisfying to stipulate that we can just “tell” which
[probability] functions are reasonable and which are not. Reasonable people have
conflicting intuitions here. ... If, at a critical point, the [fine-tuning] argument turns on a
subjectively variable sense of which assessments of probabilities are reasonable, a sense
that cannot be adjudicated in terms of any more fundamental criteria, then the [fine-
tuning argument] is effectively forceless.  (MMV, 206)
There is something rhetorically strange about this criticism. MMV, by their lights, have just
shown that the fine-tuning argument on the logical interpretation is demolished. One is then led
to ask whether the fine-tuning argument would fare any better on a different interpretation of
probability. MMV proceed to reject the subjectivist interpretation, because the fine-tuning
argument would be weak on that interpretation. But then why not reject the logical interpretation
too? If those are the only two interpretations on the table, and one is being charitable to the fine-
tuning argument, then one should focus on how the fine-tuning argument fares on the
interpretation that is most promising. On the subjectivist interpretation, as MMV implicitly
admit, the argument is not demolished; the argument would go through for those agents who
happen to have subjective probability functions such that P(G|L) > P(G).
There is a more substantive problem with MMV’s criticism too. MMV suggest that we
should not expect agreement on which subjective probability functions are reasonable and which
aren’t. But in fact, for many cases there is widespread agreement about such matters. For
example, any reasonable person would reject a probability function which held that the sky being
blue provides evidence that the moon is made of green cheese. It would be worth examining
whether there is similar widespread agreement that only probability functions which are such
that P(G|L) > P(G) are reasonable. This is what I will try to do in Section 5 below. 
Nevertheless, there is something correct about MMV’s criticism. It is the case that, on the
subjectivist interpretation, there is no way to ensure that all reasonable, rational agents have the
same probability function. But this is just the way the world is; different people have different
opinions about things, even when the people are all being reasonable and rational. The point of
the subjectivist interpretation is to probabilistically represent rational people’s actual opinions;
the point is not to see what probabilities are generated when one applies ostensibly a priori
principles like the Principle of Indifference. 
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interpretation of probability is more promising than the fine-tuning argument utilizing a
frequency-based objective or logical interpretation of probability. My arguments have been
parochial ones, in the sense that they have mostly focussed on the implications of the various
interpretations for the fine-tuning argument. A different way to debate the merits of the various
interpretations for the fine-tuning argument would be to debate the merits of the various
interpretations themselves. For example, I believe that the frequency-based objective
interpretation should be rejected because we often assign probabilities in the absence of
frequency data, and the logical interpretation should be rejected because at least sometimes there
are multiple rational yet conflicting ways to apply ostensibly a priori principles like the Principle
of Indifference. But these issues are part of a huge debate in the literature, and to engage in that
debate is beyond the scope of this paper. This section is simply designed to show that the fine-
tuning argument is most promising on the subjectivist interpretation of probability.
Now, I admit that my claim that the fine-tuning argument doesn’t fare well on a non-
subjectivist interpretation of probability hasn’t been conclusively defended in this section. While
I have argued for that claim, I admit that my arguments aren’t definitive. If you are in agreement
with my arguments, then the natural move is to evaluate the fine-tuning argument utilizing a
subjectivist interpretation of probability. But even if you are not in agreement with my
arguments, it’s still worth examining how the fine-tuning argument fares on a subjectivist
interpretation, and that’s what I’ll be doing for the rest of this paper. 
3. Observational Selection Effects
Given that one takes the subjective probability approach to the fine-tuning argument, there is a
simple but prima facie powerful objection to the argument which must be considered. The
objection is that we  know that we exist, and hence we already fully believe that the universe is
life-permitting: P(L) = 1. It automatically follows that P(L|G) = P(L|~G), and hence P(G|L) =
P(G). 
This is the sort of objection that Sober (2003, 44) raises against the fine-tuning argument.
In Section 1, I presented the fine-tuning argument as depending on the following inequality:
(1)   P(L|G) > P(L|~G).
Sober agrees that the argument boils down to this inequality, but in place of “G” Sober has
“Design”, in place of “~G” Sober has “Chance”, and in place of “L” Sober has “constants are
right” (in other words, the constants are what they would need to be for the universe to be life-
permitting). I take it that I’m not changing the meaning of his discussion by doing these
substitutions.
Sober maintains that there’s a problem with (1). Specifically, Sober says that we need to
take the following claim into account:
We exist, and if we exist the constants must be right.
Sober says that since we need to take that claim into account, “instead of [(1)], we should have
said”:
(2)   P(L | G & we exist) = P(L | ~G & we exist) = 1.
Sober says that we have to evaluate the fine-tuning argument using (2), not (1), because of an
observational selection effect: if we didn’t exist, we wouldn’t be able to make any observations.
Sober (2003, 44) then points out that, given that we exist, “the constants must be right, regardless
8of whether the Universe was produced by intelligent design or by chance.” Sober concludes from
this that the fact that the universe is life-permitting and hence that the constants are right does
not favor Design over Chance; in other words, according to Sober, L does not provide evidence
for G, and hence the fine-tuning argument fails.
I believe that an appeal to an observational selection effect is not a good reply to the fine-
tuning argument. Even though L has to be the case in order for us to make observations at all, it
doesn’t follow that L can’t provide evidence for some proposition (like G). In this section, I will
give an example to show that there are circumstances where we clearly take the fact that the
universe is life-permitting to count as evidence for a proposition. In the next section, I will lay
out a general theoretical framework that allows for this sort of evidential relation.
 Suppose that you find yourself in the presence of a closed box, and in communication
with God. God tells you that inside the box is a ball that is either black or white. Since you have
no further information about the color of the ball, you decide to assign subjective probability 0.5
to the proposition that the ball is white. Suppose that God then tells you that, to decide whether
or not to create a life-permitting universe, he used a random number generator to generate an
integer between 0 and 100: if the number 0 was generated, he created a non-life-permitting
universe and put a black ball in the box; if the number 1 was generated, he created a life-
permitting universe (including life) and put a black ball in the box, while if any other number
was generated, he created a life-permitting universe (including life) and put a white ball in the
box. 
Based on this new understanding of the relationship between the existence of a life-
permitting universe and the color of the ball, it seems clear that one should revise one’s
probability for the hypothesis that the ball is white, from 0.5 to 0.99. This is a scenario where the
existence of a life-permitting universe counts as evidence for the proposition that the ball is
white. This is so even though we already fully believe that the universe is life-permitting. It
follows that there is something wrong with the suggestion that an observational selection effect
prevents the existence of a life-permitting universe from having evidential significance for us.
4. The Problem of Old Evidence
Let’s go back to the objection as presented at the beginning of the previous section: we already
believe that the universe is life-permitting, and hence P(L) = 1, and hence P(G|L) = P(G). 
This objection is not adequate as a reply to the fine-tuning argument, because it proves too much.
There are many cases where we have some evidence E such that P(E) = 1, and yet we think that
E provides epistemic support for some hypothesis H. Perhaps the most famous example is E
being the (true) proposition that the precession of the perihelion of Mercury is 5600 seconds of
arc per century, and H being general relativity. When general relativity was proposed, people
already knew what the amount of the precession of the perihelion of Mercury was, and yet the
precession was taken to provide epistemic support for general relativity. This is one instance of
the problem of old evidence.
Note that problem of old evidence wouldn’t arise for an ideal Bayesian agent, because by
definition such agents are logically omniscient. An ideal agent would know about the proposition
H and would assign some probability to H at the beginning of her reasoning process (such as
when she is born). As long as E is evidence in the sense that it wasn’t available to her at the
beginning of her reasoning process, then there will be some time when her prior probability
4There is an unpublished paper by Robin Collins (2003b), however, where he does utilize
the problem of old evidence approach to the fine-tuning argument. Collins and I developed our
ideas independently. 
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function is updated by learning E. When she learns that E she will immediately see the evidential
connection between E and H, so her probability for H would be adjusted accordingly. Because
the problem of old evidence doesn’t arise for ideal Bayesian agents, it is allowable for a solution
to the problem to deviate from the strict Bayesian rules. Indeed, the solution I will utilize below
does this.
There is no agreed-upon solution to the problem of old evidence, but one standard type of
solution is as follows. (See Glymour (1980, 87-91), Howson (1984, 1985, 1991), Jeffrey (1995),
and Barnes (1999) for some discussions of this solution.) Let P– be one’s prior probability
function, and let P+ be one’s posterior probability function, once one has taken into account that
there is a potential evidential connection between E and H. According to this solution to the
problem of old evidence, once one learns about the potential connection, one should suppose that
one does not fully believe that E, and revise all one’s probability assignments accordingly, to
generate an ur-probability function P*. One should then set P+(H) = P*(H|E). There are many
cases where P–(H) = P*(H), since in pretending that one does not fully believe that E, that would
generally not influence one’s probability for H. In such cases, as long as P*(H|E) > P*(H), then
P+(H) > P–(H), and E counts as evidence for H. 
One of the drawbacks of the ur-probability solution is that it is not always clear what
values the ur-probabilities should take, especially when one has to make extreme modifications
to one’s opinion, by for example supposing that one does not fully believe that one exists. (For
example, one much-discussed issue is whether one should suppose that one never fully believed
that E was true, or whether one should suppose that one forgot that E was true.) Nevertheless, we
need to have some way of accounting for how propositions like L can count as evidence, and the
ur-probability solution is the best approach available. As far as I know, though, there is no
instance in the literature of a proponent of the fine-tuning argument citing the problem of old
evidence in their discussion of the argument, let alone utilizing the ur-probability solution in
formulating the argument.4 As a result, proponents’ presentations of the fine-tuning argument are
less strong than they could be. 
Here is how the fine-tuning argument goes, utilizing the ur-probability solution. One
starts with an initial probability for the existence of God, P–(G), and one wants to see whether
the fine-tuning evidence is such that the fact that our universe is life-permitting provides
evidence for G. In short, one wants to see whether P+(G) > P–(G). 
One can start by generating an ur-probability function under the supposition that one
does not fully believe that L. One can assume that P–(G) = P*(G), as is standard in cases
involving old evidence. (I will come back to this assumption later, however.) To establish a
value for P+(G), one can use Bayes’ Rule: P+(G) = P*(G|L) = P*(L|G) P*(G) / P*(L). To
establish a value for P*(L), it helps to note that P*(L) = P*(L|G) P*(G) + P*(L|~G) P*(~G). So
the crucial question becomes: what are the values for P*(L|G) and P*(L|~G)? 
In fact, we don’t need to come up with precise values for those quantities. As long as
P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G), we have the desired result that P+(G) > P–(G). This follows because P*(L)
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is a weighted average of P*(L|G) and P*(L|~G), so if P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G), then P*(L|G) >
P*(L). If P*(L|G) > P*(L), then P*(G|L) > P*(G) (from Bayes’ Rule). It would then follow that
P+(G) = P*(G|L) > P*(G) = P–(G), as desired. 
At this point, all the proponents of the fine-tuning argument need to show is that P*(L|G)
is indeed greater than P*(L|~G). Here is where they can appeal to the fine-tuning evidence.
P*(L|~G) is low, because the range of life-permitting fundamental constants is small compared
to the range of all possible fundamental constants. P*(L|G), by contrast, is high, because one
would expect God to create a life-permitting universe. It follows that P+(G) > P–(G); the fine-
tuning evidence does lead to an increase in one’s probability for the existence of God.
This is a strong argument for theism. I think that philosophers haven’t always appreciated
how strong this argument is, because it hasn’t been presented in the way that I have presented it
above. In lieu of the appeal to the ur-probability solution to the problem of old evidence, the
fine-tuning argument has been presented in a way such that it’s generally not clear how
probabilities involving L are generated; specifically, it’s generally not clear how probabilities of
the form P(L|X) can take any value other than one. (See for example the list of references cited in
Section 1.) What I have shown is that, by appealing to the ur-probability solution to the problem
of old evidence, one can present a rigorous version of the fine-tuning argument. 
5. Against the Fine-Tuning Argument
Since the above version of the fine-tuning argument relies on a subjectivist interpretation
of probability, there’s a sense in which the argument is easy to refute. One simply needs to come
up with a prior and ur-probability function such that P+(G) = P–(G). For an agent with those
probability functions, the fine-tuning argument will not be successful. The important question
though is whether such probability functions are reasonable ones to have. Do reasonable people
who are opposed to the fine-tuning argument actually have those probability functions, or could
they reasonably adopt them? 
Consider the option of adopting an ur-probability function such that P*(L|G) = P*(L|~G).
One way to get this equality would be to hold that P*(L|~G) is high, while going along with the
claim of the proponents of the fine-tuning argument that P*(L|G) is high. The most natural way
to hold that P*(L|~G) is high would involve rejecting the fine-tuning evidence. In other words,
one would hold that the fundamental constants could take a wide range of values and still be life-
permitting. If one sincerely believed that the fine-tuning evidence was faulty, then it might be
legitimate to set P*(L|~G) to be high. Physicist Steven Weinberg could be one of these people:
he has said that he is “not impressed with these supposed instances of fine-tuning” (1999, 46).
But for those who are moved by the fine-tuning evidence, this is not a live option. 
A different way to get the result that P*(L|G) = P*(L|~G) would be to hold that P*(L|G)
is low, while going along with the claim of the proponents of the fine-tuning argument that
P*(L|~G) is low. One could hold that – in the absence of belief that the universe is life-
permitting – one sees little reason for God to create a life-permitting universe. This is how Jan
Narveson (2003, 97-9), for example, might respond to the fine-tuning argument. Narveson
suggests that, if God were to exist, the ways of God would be so mysterious that we couldn’t
make any reasonable predictions about what God would or wouldn’t do. Thus, it would be open
to Narveson to say that the ur-probability of a life-permitting universe is the same regardless of
whether God exists. 
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Even though there’s a sense in which the fine-tuning argument is easy to refute (in for
example the above-described ways), there’s a sense in which it’s not. To be unmoved by the
fine-tuning argument in the ways described above, one actually has to believe that the fine-
tuning evidence is faulty, or one actually has to believe that God would not be expected to create
a life-permitting universe. Since (in my opinion, at least) belief is not a matter of the will, as long
as one does not hold these beliefs, one cannot refute the fine-tuning argument in these ways. In
fact, in my opinion most people would reject those beliefs – most people would find the fine-
tuning evidence at least somewhat plausible, and most people would deem it probable that God
would create a life-permitting universe. 
The response I will now give to the fine-tuning argument is stronger than those
considered above, in that it does not involve rejecting premises of the argument that most people
find plausible. The premise of the argument I will question is one that hasn’t been questioned
before, but that’s because the premise isn’t salient unless one formulates the argument utilizing
ur-probabilities. I maintain that for most everyone it is unreasonable to hold that  P–(G) = P*(G),
instead P*(G) should be much lower than P–(G). The reason this is the case is that for most
everyone, beliefs that entail that the universe is life-permitting are part of the evidence people
have taken into account in forming their prior probability for the existence of God, P–(G). (Their
probability is “prior” in  the sense that they have not yet taken into account the fine-tuning
evidence.) For example, Christians believe in God in part because they believe Biblical accounts
about Jesus, but the existence of Jesus entails that the universe is life-permitting. In formulating
an ur-probability for the existence of God, one cannot take into account Biblical accounts about
Jesus. More generally, one cannot take into account the existence of complex features that Paley
appeals to, like the human eye, one cannot take into account the existence of consciousness, and
so on. One’s ur-probability for the existence of God would have to be founded on the plausibility
of a priori arguments for the existence of God, like the ontological argument, and the plausibility
of arguments which appeal to general features of the universe that don’t entail the universe is
life-permitting, like the cosmological argument. The only types of people for whom it wouldn’t
be the case that P–(G) > P*(G) are those whose sole reasons for believing in God are arguments
like the ontological argument and the cosmological argument. 
Now, recall that P+(G) = P*(G|L). In the previous section, where it was assumed that
P–(G) = P*(G), to establish that P+(G) > P–(G), all we had to do was establish that P*(G|L) >
P*(G). Now, we see that matters are more complicated: even if P*(G|L) > P*(G), it still could be
the case that P*(G|L) = P–(G), and hence P+(G) = P–(G). What one has to establish is whether the
fine-tuning evidence gives one more of a reason to believe in the existence of God, besides all
the evidence one had from before which was based on the universe being life-permitting. 
It turns out that this depends on the details of how one supposes that one doesn’t know
that the universe is life-permitting. (Here and below, I will assume that when one doesn’t know
that P, one knows that one doesn’t know that P, and hence one doesn’t fully believe that P.) I
will describe various scenarios for supposing that one doesn’t know that the universe is life-
permitting, the first of which is favorable to proponents of the fine-tuning argument, the others of
which are not. I will then argue that there is no conclusive reason to favor one scenario over the
others. 
First, one can imagine that one does not know that the universe is life-permitting by
imagining that one knows the form of the fundamental physical laws of the universe, but one
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does not know the values of the constants that are involved in those laws. Before taking into
account the fine-tuning evidence, one might have thought that a wide range of values for the
fundamental constants would allow for a life-permitting universe, but the fine-tuning evidence
shows that that is not the case. It follows that P*(G|L) > P–(G), and the fine-tuning argument is
successful.
Alternatively, one can imagine that one does not know that the universe is life-permitting
by imagining that one knows the number of particles in the universe, what types they are, and
their intrinsic properties, but one does not know the fundamental laws governing how these
particles interact. Or, one can imagine that one knows the density of matter in each region of
spacetime, but one does not know what types of particles exist in those regions, or how they
interact. (There are many other possibilities as well; I leave it to the reader to generate other
options.) On either of these scenarios, there would be many possible universes which are not
life-permitting, and hence one would hold that our universe being life-permitting provides
evidence for the existence of God, in the sense that P*(G|L) > P*(G). But nevertheless, P*(G|L)
= P–(G), because the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t change one’s assessment of the various non-
life-permitting universes one deems possible. In supposing that one knows that various types of
particles in existence, but not the fundamental laws, the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t affect one’s
assessment of the probability of life-permitting universes. The fine-tuning evidence just focusses
on one particular set of fundamental laws, whereas in the scenario imagined we are allowing for
all logically possible fundamental laws that are compatible with the existence of those types of
particles. Facts about the fundamental constants for our particular laws simply don’t matter in
that case. Similarly, in supposing that one knows the density of matter in each region of
spacetime, the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t affect one’s assessment of the probability of life-
permitting universes. The fine-tuning evidence just focusses on one particular set of fundamental
laws, whereas in the scenario imagined we are allowing for all logically possible fundamental
laws that are compatible with the actual density of matter. In these scenarios, P+(G) = P–(G), and
the fine-tuning argument is unsuccessful.
How should we adjudicate between these various scenarios? The literature on the
problem of old evidence is of no help – there are no agreed-upon prescriptions for how to
generate one’s ur-probability function. The proponent of the fine-tuning argument might attempt
to argue that we should hold the laws of physics fixed, and just vary the values of the constants,
because that will produce possible universes that are most similar to our actual universe. But this
argument is no good – similarity judgements are notoriously context-dependent, and there are
important senses in which a universe with the same number and types of particles as ours, or a
universe with the same density distribution as ours, is more similar to ours than a universe which
differs in the number and types of particles or the density distribution but holds the laws of
physics fixed. I conclude that there is no requirement from rationality or considerations of
reasonableness which forces one to generate ur-probabilities in the way proponents of the fine-
tuning argument want one to. It follows that one is open to generate ur-probabilities via a
scenario that renders ineffective the fine-tuning evidence. 
The general point is as follows: when faced with the fine-tuning evidence, it is reasonable
to not be surprised. We already knew that there are many possible universes that are not life-
permitting, and yet are similar in certain ways to our actual universe. The fine-tuning argument
encourages us to focus our attention on those possible universes that have the same laws of
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physics as ours, but different fundamental constants. But why not focus on those possible
universes that have the same types of particles as ours, but different fundamental laws? Or why
not focus on those possible universes that have the same density distribution as ours, but
different types of particles? Before I was faced with the fine-tuning evidence, I already knew that
our universe was special, in the sense that there are many possible universes similar to ours in
certain ways and yet not life-permitting. I already knew that, if God existed, God would have to
choose to actualize our life-permitting universe from among a sea of similar non-life-permitting
universes. I already knew that, if God did not exist, there’s a sense in which we are lucky that the
universe is life-permitting – there are many possible universes similar to ours which are not. The
fine-tuning evidence doesn’t change any of that, and hence the fine-tuning evidence doesn’t
change my probability for the existence of God.
6. The Many-Universes Objection
I believe that the reply I’ve given above is the strongest reply one can give to the fine-tuning
argument. It is hard to argue this point, since I’d have to consider all possible stronger replies to
the fine-tuning argument and show that they are all unsuccessful. Instead, I will consider two
prima facie powerful objections to the fine-tuning argument, and I will show that they are
mistaken. 
The objections are based on the many-universes version of the fine-tuning argument, so I
will start by explaining that version. Sometimes, the fine-tuning argument is construed not as an
argument for theism, but as an argument for the existence of many universes. (See for example
Rees 2000.) The thought is that the existence of our universe, with just the fundamental
constants it has, is highly improbable if there is only one universe, but is highly probable if there
are an infinite number of universes, where different fundamental constants obtain in the different
universes. Thus, the existence of our universe provides evidence for the existence of many
universes.
Now, instead of using the facts about fine-tuning as evidence for the existence of many
universes, one might try to use the existence of many universes as a way of rejecting the theistic
fine-tuning argument. I will examine two ways that one could attempt to do this.
First, one might try to reject the step in the argument which holds that P*(L|G) >
P*(L|~G). (In the many-universes context, it’s best to take L to be the proposition that there
exists a life-permitting universe.) Supposing that many universes exist, one could argue
P*(L|~G) is high; even in the absence of a God we would expect there to exist a life-permitting
universe. One could then argue that the existence of a God wouldn’t make it any more likely for
a life-permitting universe to exist, so P*(L|G) = P*(L|~G). 
The problem with this reply is that it relies on fully believing that there are many
universes. It seems strange to have such a conviction; to the extent that there is evidence at all in
favor of the existence of many universes, the evidence is weak. But as long as one assigns a
probability less than 1 to the hypothesis that there are many universes, the theistic fine-tuning
argument will still have force. On the supposition that there are many universes, P*(L|G) =
P*(L|~G), while on the supposition that there is just one universe, P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G); one’s
actual ur-probabilities will be a weighted average of the ur-probabilities obtained on those two
suppositions, and hence P*(L|G) > P*(L|~G).
The second way to attempt to use the existence of many universes to reject the theistic
5For helpful comments, many thanks to Nick Bostrom, Brian Kierland, Neil Manson,
Lydia McGrew, Tim McGrew, Chad Mohler, Al Plantinga, Ted Poston, Elliott Sober, and
Jessica Wittmer. Thanks also to the audiences at talks based on previous versions of this paper,
at the Society of Christian Philosophers conference at Asbury College (December 2003) and at
the University of Missouri at Columbia (February 2004). 
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fine-tuning argument is as follows. One could admit that the fine-tuning evidence seems to
provide evidence for the existence of God, but one could hold that that once one considers the
many-universes hypothesis, it turns out that the fine-tuning evidence provides evidence for the
many-universes hypothesis instead. 
The problem with this reply is that this is not how Bayesian confirmation works. If one
has two hypotheses, H1 and H2, and P(E|H1) = P(E|H2), then it follows from Bayes’ rule that the
ratio of the prior probabilities is preserved: P(H1) / P(H2) = P(H1|E) / P(H2|E). The ur-probability
of the existence of a life-permitting universe is presumably about the same on the supposition
that God exists as it is on the supposition that many universes exist: P*(L|G) . P*(L|M), where
M is the many-universes hypothesis. It follows that P*(G) / P*(M) . P*(G|L) / P*(M|L). Thus, if
P*(M|L) > P*(M), then we would expect that P*(G|L) > P*(G); the evidence confirms both
hypotheses. 
I conclude that the theistic fine-tuning argument is a powerful argument; for example, it
cannot be reasonably refuted by an appeal to many universes. Nevertheless, as described in the
previous section, there are ways of resisting its force. It is reasonable to hold that the fine-tuning
evidence does not provide evidence for the existence of God.5
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